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Coalition negotiations are an important factor in the strategic
voting calculations made by European electorates.
by Blog Admin
Strategic voting, where voters give their support to a less favoured party in order to influence
the result of an election, is a common feature of many democracies. Orit  Kedar argues that
while a great deal of work has been done to study the nature of strategic voting, it has
generally focused exclusively on voter calculations about a party’s ability to win parliamentary
seats. Calculations about coalition negotiations, such as voting for one half of a likely
governing coalition, have mostly been overlooked; yet they may play a crucial role in
determining how European electorates cast their vote.
Although every voter in an election will have a candidate or a party which comes closest to matching their
own pref erences, other f actors can inf luence the way cit izens choose to vote. A common example is that if
a voter ’s pref erred candidate has litt le hope of  being elected to of f ice, they may adopt a f orm of  strategic
voting and select an alternative candidate who stands more chance of  success. This alternative candidate
will not match their pref erences quite so well, but they may be the best option out of  those candidates who
have a realistic chance of  gaining power.
In democracies which use a simple-majority, single vote system f or elections, such as the ‘f irst past the
post’ method typically used f or national elections in the UK and the US, this ef f ect is well established.
Based on the work of  Maurice Duverger, it is of ten f ormalised as part of  ‘Duverger ’s law’, which, put simply,
states that voting procedures such as f irst past the post will tend to promote a system where two large
parties primarily compete f or power (such as Labour and the Conservatives in the UK). In addition to the
psychological ef f ect of  voters supporting more successf ul candidates to avoid wasting their vote, there is
also a mechanical ef f ect in the sense that this f orm of  voting tends to naturally skew the distribution of
parliamentary seats in f avour of  larger parties.
In democracies which use other f orms of  voting, such as proportional representation systems where a
number of  seats are contested in the same electoral district, the ef f ect is less clear. Gary Cox has
established the presence of  strategic voting in proportional representation elections.  The common
wisdom, however, states that the incentives to use strategic voting will weaken as the number of  seats per
district rise. This is intuit ive because when the number of  seats reaches a certain level it should become
dif f icult f or voters to determine which parties are likely to be in contention f or seats and which parties are
unviable.
Using data f rom the Comparative Study of  Electoral Systems, I have examined this principle across
seventeen elections in seventeen dif f erent countries. In each of  the cases, respondents were asked to
place themselves, as well as the main polit ical parties in their country, on a general lef t- right ideology scale,
which allows us to calculate the ideological distance between each voter and the available parties.
Respondents also provided their vote choice, enabling us to examine the number of  voters who chose to
support the party closest to them ideologically. Figure 1 below illustrates the f indings, with the proportion
of  voters supporting the party closest to them shown on the vertical axis and the average (median) number
of  seats contested per electoral district in each country shown on the horizontal axis.
Figure 1 – Voter choice and district magnitude
Note: Elect ion years: Australia 2004, Belgium (Flanders) 1999, Britain 2005, Canada 2005,
Denmark 2001, Finland 2003, Germany 2002, Iceland 2003, Ireland 2002, Israel 2006, Italy
2006, The Netherlands 2002, New Zealand 2002, Norway 2001, Portugal 2005, Sweden 2002,
Switzerland 2003.
Contrary to expectations, there is no systematic relationship between the number of  seats contested per
district and voters being drawn away f rom the party closest to them ideologically. Indeed, some countries
with single member districts, such as Canada and the UK, exhibit higher rates of  ‘proximity voting’ than
countries much higher on the district magnitude scale, such as Switzerland and the Netherlands. Obviously,
in all systems included in the f igure, voters have multiple allegiances, and various f actors pull them in
dif f erent directions. Religious af f init ies, class relations and ethnic identit ies all play a part in the voters’
choice. I do not presume to analyse all f actors af f ecting voter choice in this study. Simply, the f igure
suggests that voters are pulled away f rom their ideologically pref erred parties just as of ten in systems with
a high number of  seats per district, as they are in other systems.
Although the graph shows litt le evidence f or a link between strategic voting and district magnitude, it does
not necessarily imply that the common approach is incorrect. Rather, it suggests that there may be other
f actors af f ecting the choices of  voters. Polit ical scientists have generally taken Duverger ’s lead by
f ocusing on the conversion of  votes into seats and the desire to avoid a wasted vote f or an unviable
polit ical party; however other stages of  the electoral and post-electoral process exist and may be just as
important in creating incentives f or strategic voting.
Where coalit ion negotiations take place, the process is detailed and nuanced, yet it can be generally
described as consisting of  at least f our steps. First, votes are turned into legislative seats and a
parliamentary party system emerges. Second, a f ormateur – the individual charged with negotiating a
coalit ion – is selected by the head of  state. Third, potential partners are approached and of ten a coalit ion
is f ormed. Finally, portf olios are allocated to cabinet members. Once this process is completed, the
f ormation of  policy begins, involving dif f erent cabinet members, parliamentary committees and members of
parliament f rom both the coalit ion and the opposition. Although in practice these steps may blend into each
other, in terms of  their ef f ect on voters we can think of  them as distinct. Each step, I argue, provides
voters with dif f erent incentives to engage in strategic voting. Importantly, not all steps take place af ter all
elections and in all countries: which steps are activated and which are muted depends on the institutional
regime and election results.
The f irst step of  the process – translating votes into legislative seats – corresponds with the work of
Duverger, as discussed above. In the second step, the f ormateur is usually, though not always, the head of
the largest party in parliament. One can imagine voter choice taking into account this important step. For
instance, voters may desert a f avourite small party and instead support a larger party if  they think the latter
may become the largest or the one chosen to lead the government.
Once the f ormateur is selected, meetings are held with leaders of  various parties who attempt to f orm a
governing coalit ion. Voters may engage in one of  at least two strategies to af f ect the governing coalit ion.
First, a voter may directly vote to af f ect the likelihood of  a pref erred coalit ion. Second, and perhaps more
nuanced, is what Thomas Gschwend def ines as a ‘coalit ion insurance strategy’. Under this strategy, voters
support a small party, the potentially junior member of  a pref erred coalit ion, when they perceive this party
to be in danger of  f alling below the electoral threshold necessary f or gaining a parliamentary seat.
In the f inal stage, where responsibilit ies are divided between coalit ion partners, a dif f erent incentive is
available f or voters. If  voters expect a particular coalit ion to emerge f rom an election then they may
withdraw their support f rom their support f rom their pref erred party overall and vote f or their pref erred
member of  that coalit ion in order to increase the party’s bargaining power (and theref ore ability to gain key
government responsibilit ies) relative to the other members of  the coalit ion.
It is easy to see that various strategies can lead voters to support dif f erent parties. A lef t- leaning voter in a
three-party system with parties Lef t, Centre and Right may support the Lef t party in an attempt to increase
the likelihood of  a Centre-Lef t coalit ion emerging or to af f ect the appointment of  the f ormateur.
Alternatively, suspecting that a Centre-Right government will emerge, a voter may choose to strengthen the
Centre party in government and hence desert the Lef t party.
Under the f irst past the post system, usually only the f irst stage of  this process is likely to have relevance
as the subsequent stages – selecting a f ormateur, f orming a coalit ion and distributing government
responsibilit ies – are of ten not applicable due to the likelihood of  a single party gaining a majority. This is
an important, but nonetheless only one, f orm of  strategic voting. Under proportional representation with
small district magnitudes this consideration is still activated, and as the magnitude increases it becomes
less and less relevant. Similarly, as the likelihood of  a multi-party government increases it is other
considerations that are activated. In other words, every electoral system is likely to have some
considerations activated and others not, depending on the potency of  each of  the f our steps I have set
out above.
Parliamentary polit ics dif f ers greatly across countries. In this article, I have ref lected on the set of
incentives posed to voters, and in particular on the ones posed by the f ormation of  multi-party
government. Putting potential strategies in a parliamentary f ramework enabled me to revisit our
understanding of  the f amiliar version of  strategic voting and see it as a special case of  an array of
strategies, a case activated by the f irst of  several post-electoral steps, the allocation of  parliamentary
seats. While polit ical scientists have invested a great ef f ort in understanding these steps in and of
themselves, they have commonly f ocused on the single step crucial in ‘f irst past the post’ voting as
inf orming, and indeed def ining, the motivation of  policy-minded voters. But barriers to attainment of  a
parliamentary seat are one in a set of  parliamentary f ilters that make votes count (or not).
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